Cost recovery and pricing of payment services by Humphrey, David B. et al.
\_WPsIs  83{
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1833
Cost Recovery and Pricing  The cost of providinrx
payment services  is suJstantial
of Payment Services  -- about 3 percent of  DP.
Cost reduiction  requires the






















































































































dPOLICY RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1833
Summary findings
A modern payment system is essential for promotinig  slhow  how underlying cost data are used to "build up" to
domestic and international trade and exclhange  as wcll as  a price. They outline how payment services may best be
developing financial markets. Payment users will be  structured to:
directed toward the most efficient payment metlhods  Appropriately reflect economies of scale or scope in
when the costs of producing those services are reflectcd  the production  of payment services.
in the prices paid.  *  Adjust cost recovery percentages to accommodate
Resources are being wasted in the United States  how much demand conditions associated with start-up
because consumers see no important difference in  differ from those associated with mature operation.
transaction prices or bank costs between usinig a check or  (During a new system's early years of operation,  the
using electronic direct debit in paying a bill, even trhigh  transaction volume may be low and some form of
the social costs of these two instruments are differeniv  uniderrecovery  of costs may be required to encourage use
Electronic payments cost only a third to half as muLc11  as  of the system. But any such underrecovery must be built
paper-based payments. An estimated $100 billion (on 1.5  into ftuture  pricing arrangements once the systems are
percent of GDP) is being lost by the continued use ot  established and traffic volumes are at a level where full
paper-based checks.  cost recovery is practical. To ensure fairness, the pricing
When payment instruments are not appropriatelN  structure  must also guarantee that latecomers to the
priced, the costs must be covered elsewhere. One  system do not get more favorable treatment than the
common solution is to let loan revenues cover part of  initial user group.)
payment expenses (keeping loan rates hiiglher  to  *  Induce efficient use of scarce resources.
compensate). When prices reflect the full cost of  They note the economic principles that  recommend
producing the service, users demand the services thai uLse  certain pricing methods over others and apply equally to
the fewest real resources.  payment services provided by the private sector or
Humphrey,  Keppler, and Montes-Negret give  tlhrough a government agency. They show why costs
examples of payment prices and price.schedules and  sh,ould be recovered through user transaction fees.
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A  modern payment system is a  necessary  prerequisite  for  promoting domestic and
international  trade and exchange  as  well as developing  financial markets. An efficient payment
system,  one which minimizes  the expense  of making  payments  relative  to benefits  received,  lowers
the resource  cost  of achieving  these  goals. Payment  users  will be directed  toward  the most  efficient
payment  methods  when the underlying  costs  of producing  these  services  are  reflected  in the prices
paid.
Efficiency  considerations  are increasingly  important  since the introduction of computer
based  national  payments  systems  requires  significant  investment  during  the design,  development,
testing and operational  phases.  At some point during the design and development  process,
decisions  must  be made  as  to the fees  to be charged  to initial and  future users  of the new systems.
Towards  this end Part  I of this document  will:
+  Outline the cost recovery  principles  and objectives,  showing why costs need to be
recovered  through  user  transaction  fees;
*  Note  the level  and  sources  of payment  costs;
*  Indicate  how sensitive  users  are  to changes  in payment  prices;
*  Discuss  the  various  methods  used  to determine  prices;
*  Illustrate  how some  countries  have  chosen  to price  their payment  services;  and
*  Note  the data  needed  for pricing  payment  services  in emerging  market  economies
Part  11  of this document  contains  a discussion  of the practical  issues  of setting  prices  for the
payment  systems  provided  from the perspective  of all payment  systems  participants  including;  the
central  bank  as  a service  provider,  commercial  banks  as users  of the central  bank  provided  services
and the customers  of  the commercial  banks. The discussion  also covers the essentials  for
developing  a two-part pricing mechanism  based  on the calculation  of fixed and variable cost
components  as  a basis  for determining  unit transaction  fees.
PART I
2. Cost  recovery: principles  and  objectives
Should  payment  costs  be recovered?  In general,  prices  for bank  and central  bank payment
services  should  be set  so as  to recover  the resource  costs  involved  in supplying  them. In deciding2
which payment  service  to use,  payers  essentially  compare  the costs  and benefits  of each payment
instrument,  choosing  the one with the largest  net benefit. If prices  are less  than costs  then net
benefits  will be overstated  and instruments  will be  overused.  This  wastes  real resources.
Practical  cost recovery  strategies  can  be designed  and accepted  for implementation  during
the system  development  life-cycle  within the  following framework:
*  partial cost recovery,  where the provider aims to  recover  only a proportion of its
development  and operational  costs;
*  full cost recovery,  where  the prices  are  set  at a level  which are  designed  to recover  the
full development  and  operating  costs;
*  planned growth cost recovery,  where the price is set to recover  the full costs and
provide  funds  for the next  purchase  of capital  equipment;  and
*  profit, where  the prices  are set  to recover  total costs,  provide  for future enhancements
and provide  a suitable  return  to the owners  of the system  for the capital  invested.
Careful  consideration  should be given to pricing policies when the initial services  are
provided  by a government  entity  such  as  a central  bank.  In many  cases,  the central  bank  will be  the
only viable initial provider  of services.  However,  the pricing  policy adopted  should  not inhibit the
introduction  of competitive  services  by alternate  suppliers  at a later  date  or prevent  the central  bank
from replacing  its ownership  with the eventual  ownership  of the users.  It will be difficult, if not
impossible,  for private  suppliers  to compete  with services  that are  priced  at a level  that are  less  than
the cost  of production  or are  explicitly  subsidized,  for example,  by the non allocation  of taxes  that
would be incurred  by a private  supplier.
A specific  cost  recovery  issue  arises  during  the early  years  of operation  of a new system  in a
developing  economy.  The initial transaction  volume may be low. It is likely that some  form of
under  recovery  of costs  will be required  to encourage  use  of the system.  However,  any such  under
recovery  will  need  to be built into future pricing arrangements  once the systems  are established
and traffic  volumes  are  at a level  where  full cost  recovery  is practicable.
An additional  problem  must  also be  addressed  at the outset  and concerns  the entry  costs  to
be levied on future participants  that, for example,  join the system  after the initial design  and
development  costs  have been recovered.  To ensure  fairness,  the overall pricing structure  must
guarantee  that new users  do not get  more  favorable  treatment  than  the initial user  group.
Resources  are being wasted today in the U.S. because  consumers  see no important
difference  in per transaction  prices  or bank costs  between  using  a check  or ACH direct debit in3
paying  a bill, even  though  the social  cost of these  two instruments  are  quite different  (Table  Al).1
The same  applies  to consumer  choice between  check,  credit card,  debit card, or cash  use  at the
point of sale. Each  business  payer,  however,  initiates  a much  higher  volume of payments  than
does each  consumer. As a result,  business  payers  typically  face per transaction  fees  from banks
which may  be paid  for directly or by holding  a compensating  deposit  balance  which varies  with the
value  of bank  payment  services  used.
In effect, banks typically charge  consumers  an average  fee (minimum balance)  which
recovers  the bank expense  of payment  services  for the average  consumer. Individual  consumers
may initiate  many  or few payments  each  month  and still hold the same  balance,  so their marginal
cost of an additional  payment  is zero. Although  businesses  do experience  positive  marginal  costs
from a bank, and are thus more sensitive  to differences  in payment  instrument  expenses,  they
initiate  only 410%  of U.S.  non-cash  payments.  Consumers  as  a group initiate  56% of payments  but
do not generally  face  either a per  transaction  fee nor payment  prices  that reflect  the lower costs  of
initiating an electronic  payment. As an upper  bound estimate,  $100 billion or 1.5%  of GDP is
being  lost by the continued  use  of paper-based  checks  rather  than electronic  payments. 2 This loss
is projected  to be reduced  by 3% (the  government's  share  of check  payments)  by 1999  since new
legislation  mandates  that all federal  government  payments  be made  electronically  by this date.
State  govemments  are  also  mandating  that more  payments  be  made  electronically.
Fairness versus cross-subsidization. An additional  argument  for recovering  payment  costs
in the prices paid by users  concerns  equity or fairness. When payment instruments  are not
appropriately  priced,  their  costs  will be  covered  elsewhere  (even  if a bank is not sure  where  exactly
this is). This involves  cross-subsidization,  where some  other party  will bear  the costs  but not the
benefits. A common  type of cross-subsidization  has  been  to use  loan revenues  to cover a portion
of payment  expenses.  In this instance,  borrowers  end up paying  a higher  loan rate,  and depositors
a lower payment  price,  than  otherwise  would occur  if both banking  services  were properly  priced.
But unfairness  is not the only effect;  cross-subsidization  distorts  decisions  made  by borrowers  and
depositors.  Borrowers will  respond by  borrowing less, reducing domestic spending and
investment,  while depositors  will  respond  by overusing  payment  instruments  or using  expensive
instruments,  wasting  resources. 3
I To  cover  payment  costs,  U.S.  banks  give  consumers  a choice  of paying  a per  transaction  fee  or holding  a minimum
balance.  As most  choose  a minimum  balance,  the extra  expense  to consumers  of an additional  transaction  for different
payment  instruments  is  zero.
2  The  difference  between  the social  cost  of paper-based  and electronic  payments  in Table  Al  is $1.62 (3  $2.93 -
$1.31). Times  the 62 billion checks  currently  written,  this gives  $100  billion in resource  costs  that  potentially  could  be
saved  if all payors  switched  from checks  to electronic  payments.  During  the transition  from  paper  to electronic  payments
it is necessary  to run a dual  system.  As well, the average  cost  of checks  (electronic  payments)  estimated  here  would rise
(fall)  since,  with scale  economies,  volume  would be falling  (rising).
3Although  resources  are  still wasted,  banks  can recoup  their higher  payment  costs  associated  with payment  service
mispricing  by paying  depositors  a lower  interest  rate.4
Loss of seigniorage revenues.  Many  countries  have  sought  to expand  the use  of non-cash
payment  instruments,  both to facilitate  the emergence  and growth of financial markets  and to
improve  the ability of firms to engage  in trade  and exchange.  There  is a hidden  cost  to this effort,
albeit one that governments  seem  willing to incur. This cost is the loss  of seigniorage  revenues
from the issuing  and use of cash in domestic  transactions. If the price of non-cash  payment
instruments  do not reflect  their full cost,  then the loss  in seigniorage  revenues  will be larger  than
otherwise  would occur.
Reasons why payment  costs may not  be recovered.  Some  valid reasons  why payment
costs  may  not be fully priced  to users,  at least  initially, concern  the desire  to realize  internal  scale
economies  and/or network externalities. Non-cash  instruments  are often initially underpriced  to
encourage use and generate  volumes sufficient to  achieve lower unit costs through scale
economies.  While this is valid initially, such  underpricing  should  be eliminated  at a later  date  once
the desired  scale  economies  have  been  achieved  and  unit costs  have  been  sufficiently  reduced.
A similar  argument  can be  made,  again  only initially, when  the benefits  of participating  in a
payment  network  expand  as  more  and more  users  are  attracted  to it.  For example,  a wire transfer
network is more valuable  as more banks  belong  to it, since  all existing  users  now can send  and
receive  payments  to more  endpoints. Indeed,  the use  and acceptability  of a particular  payment
instrument  expands  as  the number  of network  participants  grows. This has  clearly  been  the case
for both paper-based  and electronic  networks. Point-of-sale  and bill payment  payees,  in particular,
are  very reluctant  to make  investments  necessary  to be able  to accept  a new payment  instrument
unless  they believe  that the volume they will  receive  is sufficiently  large  to justify the expense.
Correspondingly,  payers  are reluctant  to use  a new instrument  until it is accepted  by a sufficient
number of payees. Banks  are caught  in the middle of this conflict.  While underpricing  a new
payment  instrument  can  occur  in order  to expand  benefits  from network  participation,  there  comes
a point where the added  benefits  are  small  and the costs  of providing  payments  over  the network
should  be  fully recouped  in their price.
Although  valid reasons  for not ever  properly  pricing  a service  or output  do exist,  they have
little application  to payment  instruments  or services.  For example,  if the main benefits  of using  a
particular  payment  instrument  were not captured  by payment  originators  or receivers  but instead
benefited  some  other  group,  then charging  payment  users  would merely  "tax" users  and subsidize
this other group. This is an example  of the so-called  free rider problem. Having  payment  users
bear  the full cost  of an instrument  for which they obtain  little of the benefits  would result  in under-
utilization of the instrument. Fortunately,  payment  users-both  payers  and payees-are  the main
beneficiaries  in a payment  transaction  and this argument  for not pricing payment  instrument  use
does  not apply.5
Another  argument  made  for not pricing  non-cash  instruments  is that substitute  cash
payments  are  not  explicitly  priced. If cash  payments  are  not  priced,  while non-cash  transactions
are,  then  payers  will presumably  have  an incentive  to rely on cash. 4 Although  this can boost
seigniorage  revenues,  the  argument  is invalid  because  there  are  considerable  implicit  costs  to using
cash  in precisely  those  situations  where  non-cash  payments  can  be  most  beneficial.  This  is  where
large  value  payments  are  made  among  firms,  both  domestically  and internationally.  While  cash
use  is  often  favored  for  retail  payments  when  the  environment  is  safe  (as  in Japan,  less  so  in Europe,
but not the U.S.),  large  value  cash  transactions  have  a high opportunity  cost  and are just too
difficult  to handle  to be the instrument  of choice  for business  payments  even  when non-cash
payments  are  directly  priced.  This  is particularly  true  when  the  parties  to a transaction  are  distant
from  one  another,  as  in business  transactions  and  consumer  bill payments.  Overall,  the  only  valid
reason  for not pricing  payment  instrument  use  involves  only a temporary  suspension  of pricing,
until  scale  and  network  economies  can  be largely  realized.  Once  realized,  payment  costs  should
be  reflected  in  the  prices  faced  by users. 5
3. The  cost  of making  a payment
Payment  expenses  are incurred  by all parties  to a payment  transaction.  This includes
payers  (individuals  and  businesses)  who initiate  payments  and  payees  who receive  them. For  non-
cash  payments,  it also  includes  the  financial  institutions  (hereafter  banks)  acting  as  agents  for  payers
and  payees  who process  the  payment  information  and  actually  transfer  the  funds.  If more  than  one
bank  is involved,  as  when  the  payer  and  payee  do not  have  the  same  payment  agent,  then  inter-
bank  settlement  of the  payment  is  required.  This  usually  involves  the  central  bank.
While  most  payment  expenses  can  be  directly  measured,  very  little information  is publicly
available. This is especially  true for payer  and payee  expenses,  although  less  so for bank
processing  costs  and  central  bank  settlement  expenses.
Two country  examples  for the US and Norway  illustrate  (see  Annex 1) the cost per
transaction  of check  and  electronic  payments,  demonstrating  the much  lower  cost  of electronic
(ACH)  payments  in both  countries.
Changes  in payment  costs:  economies  of  scale  and  scope.  The larger  is the share  of fixed
expenses  in total payment  cost,  the greater  will be the economies  of scale. Payment  scale
economies  arise  because  fixed  expenses  can  be  spread  over  a larger  volume  of payments,  lowering
4  While  consumers  incur  an opportunity  cost  of holding  cash  equal  to one  plus  the rate  of inflation  times  the interest
rate,  unless  inflation  is  especially  large  most  consumers  do not actively  respond  to this 'pricet.
5A  seemingly  negative  aspect  to pricing  payment  use  according  to its cost  is  that low income  groups  may decide  not
to use  non-cash  payment  instruments  because  they are 'too expensive'.  However,  any effort to lower the price below
cost  to specific  user  groups  will involve  cross-subsidization  and  lead  to inefficiencies  in overall  use,  wasting  resources  in
the  process.6
the average  or unit cost  of a payment. Up to some  point,  the larger  is payment  volume,  the lower
is the average  cost  of processing  each  payment.
Similarly, if the extra or marginal  cost of processing  one type of payment  instrument  is
reduced  as  the volume  of another  payment  instrument  rises,  then  there  will be  economies  of scope.
When credit card payments  over a network use  the same  terminals,  communication  links, or
computers  as  debit card  payments,  the marginal  cost  of a credit  card  payment  can  fall as  debit card
volume rises  (or vice versa). Similar  economies  of scope  arise  when ATM  terminals  use  the same
communication  links  as  debit card  transactions  (as  is  more  common).  Scope  economies  exist  when
the total cost of processing  two or more  payment  instruments  together  (jointly) is lower than the
sum  of the costs  of processing  the same  volume  of each  instrument  separately. 6 (For  a discussion  of
some  empirical  evidence  of scope  and  scale  economies  see  Annex  2).
4.  Demand  for payment  services
The demand  for a payment  instrument  is influenced  by economic  variables  such as own
price, the price and availability  of substitutes,  and user income.  It is also influenced  by such
difficult to quantify  influences  as  user  convenience,  acceptability  by payees,  and safety  in use. For
this and other  reasons,  the effect  of price on the demand  for payment  instruments  has  been  difficult
to measure,  although  inferences  can  be made.
Substitution among payment instruments.  Due to a lack of extended  time-series  data
within any  one country,  it has  been  necessary  to infer  the demand  for and substitution  among  non-
cash  payment  instruments  from pooled  time-series  cross-country  analysis  using  data  developed  by
the Bank  for International  Settlements.  The relationships  among  the per person  use  of five non-cash
payment  instruments  plus  cash  is illustrated  in Table  1. Of the 15 pair-wise  correlation  coefficients,
11 are negative  suggesting  substitution. 7 However,  these  substitution  effects  are weak since the
largest  negative  correlation  coefficient  (or  r) is -.50.8
6  Scope  economies  can have  two sources.  First,  if excess  capacity  exists,  the fixed costs  associated  with processing
one  type of payment  instrument  can  be spread  over  processing  other  instruments  as  well.  For example,  if buildings  and
large  computers  have  unused  productive  capacity,  other types  of payment  instruments  may be processed  using these
same  facilities  at low additional  expense.  Second,  joint production  costs  can be lower when  certain  variable  expenses
can also be shared,  as when credit and debit card  payments  use the same  card terminals,  communication  links, or
personnel.
7  The  correlations  relate  the annual  number  of transactions  per person  across  14 developed  countries  in each  year
over 1987-93.  Cash  use  reflects  the real  value  of cash  holdings  per  person,  also  across  countries  and for  each  year.
I  The strongest  relationship is between checks and credit cards which, with  an  r  of  .81, suggests  strong
complementarity. When the U.S.  (which uses  the most checks  and credit cards)  is excluded,  the complementarity
between  checks  and  credit  cards  is reduced  but not eliminated  Cr  = .52). The  complementarity  of debit  cards  with both
paper  and  electronic  giro transactions  reflects  their  positive  cross-country  and  time-series  association  in various  European
countries  while the complementarity  between  electronic  giro use  and  cash  reflects  a positive  association  in Europe  and
Japan.7
The  simple  elasticity  between  the annual  number  of non-cash  payments  per person  and real
cash  holdings  per  person  is -.68,  so a 10%  reduction  in cash  holdings  is associated  with a 6.8% rise
in non-cash  transactions. A deeper analysis  of these  cross-country  payment effects  within  a
standard  demand  function framework  suggested  that while cash  and non-cash  payment  instrument
use  are negatively  related,  the implied  substitution  between  them is due more  to differences  in use
across  countries  than it is to changes  in use  over  the 1987-93  time period,  a result  that also  applies
to the substitution  among  the five non-cash  instruments  as  well.
Table  1: Correlation  matrix  for  per  person  use  of  payment  instruments
(14  developed  countries.  1987-93)
Paper  Electronic  Credit  Debit
Ciro  Giro  card  card  Cash
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Check  -.37  -.39  .81  -.11  -.42
Paper  Giro  -.09  -.23  .30  -.14
Electronic  Giro  -.50  .12  .19
Credit  card  -.17  -.38
Debit  card  -.39
Source:  Computed  from  time-series,  cross-section  data  from Bank  for International  Settlements  (May  1989,
December  1993,  July 1994,  December  1994,  and  May 1995)
Paymentprice elasticities. Own prices,  which are  small  in magnitude,  vary  little over  time,
and may not depend  on incremental  use,  seemingly  have  exerted  little influence  on the choice  or
use  of payment  methods. Mean own price elasticities  for paper  giro, electronic  giro, and credit
card use ranged  from -.09 to -.26 and, while significant,  appear  to be quite inelastic.  Price
elasticities  for check  and debit card use  were slightly positive  but insignificant. In contrast,  the
influence  on payment  instrument  use  from cultural  and institutional  factors,  such  as crime rates,
bank concentration,  and  the availability of  alternative payment methods, has been strong
(Humphrey,  Pulley,  and  Vesala,  1996).
Payment  instrument  price information  is more  suitable  in Scandinavia  as  countries  there  are
among  those  that actually  charge  all users  a price per transaction  for different  non-cash  payments
and have also been increasing  the relative  price of paper-based  instruments  to reflect better  the
lower supply costs  of most  electronic  payment  alternatives.  Based  on survey  information  of bank
prices  for check  and point-of-sale  electronic  payments  in Norway between  1989 and 1993, the
implied elasticity  of substitution  between  paper  and electronic  payments  is s =  4.13 (computed
from Bank  for International  Settlements,  May 1995). This implies  that payment  users  are in fact
very sensitive  to relative  payment  prices  since  a 10%  rise  in the relative  user  price of checks  seems
to be associated  with a 41  % reduction  in their relative  use. Although  additional  (and  verifying)
information  is not available,  the experience  of Norway  would likely be duplicated  elsewhere  as8
more  countries  institute  explicit  transaction  pricing  of their payment  services  and had them reflect
the lower unit cost  of electronic  payments.
5. Methods  for pricing  payment  services
Indirect pricing  methods:  float and  minimum balances.  Payment  float is a  natural
consequence  of debit transfer  paper-based  payments  (e.g.,  checks)  since  these  instruments  typically
require  some  form of physical  transport  or delivery. Paper-based  credit  transfers  (e.g.,  paper  giro)
also  generate  float if these  transactions  are not  value dated  (where  the transfer  request  is submitted
prior to the date  the transfer  is to occur). Electronic  debit or credit  transfer  payments,  of course,
need  not incur float  at all since  processing  is more  rapid  and  physical  transport  is not needed.  One
indirect method used by banks  to recoup  payment  costs  has  been  to create  even more float by
debiting payers  earlier  than needed  and/or  delaying  the crediting  of payees. Revenues  earned  on
the float created  are used  to cover  bank payment  expenses,  rather  than  directly assessing  a fee on
users. 9 A second indirect method banks use  to cover payment  expenses  concerns  a required
minimum deposit  balance. Here revenues  are earned  from the spread  between  interest  paid (if
any)  on minimum balances  and the interest  received  when these  balances  finance  loans  or other
assets.
One reason  indirect (or non-price)  methods  are used  for recovering  payment  expenses  is
that the alternative  of paying  a market  rate  of interest  on deposits  and charging  a price  for payment
use  generates  a tax liability for depositors,  as interest  income is often taxable. A related  reason,
which applies to both float and minimum balances,  is that the true cost of payment  services  to
users-especially  to consumer  users-is  less  obvious  than would be a direct fee per transaction.
This, of course, is precisely  the problem from a resource  allocation and payment efficiency
standpoint.
Neither float nor minimum balance  methods  of covering  payment  costs  will  have much
effect  in inducing  payment  users  to use  the lowest  cost  payment  instrument.  This is because  users
will not "see"  how the cost  of different  instruments  vary and will have  no incentive  to choose  the
instrument  that meets  their needs  while having  the lowest  resource  cost. To do this, some  sort of
direct fee or explicit price is needed. In what follows, a number  different  procedures  for pricing
payment  services  are  outlined,  along  with their benefits  and problems  in implementation.
9  Some  emerging  market  economies  generate  even  more  payment  float. This  occurs  when  banks  are  required  to hold
reserves  with the central  bank  sufficient  to cover  the sum  of each  day's  gross  debits,  which  are  posted  prior to that day's
gross  credits,  to clear  interbank  payments.  In Russia,  it has  been  estimated  that  close  to one-third  of the expansion  of the
money  supply  was tied up in this manner  at various  offices  of the central  bank. Such  a settlement  arrangement  was  a
holdover  from  a planned  economy  where  the time value  of money  was  zero,  as  payments  were  merely  made  from one
government  enterprise  to another. With improvements  in payment  system  efficiency,  these  balances  will fall, effectively
expanding  the useful  money  supply  (as  opposed  to the measured  money  supply,  which includes  payment  float).9
Marginal  cost  pricing.  Marginal cost pricing is were the extra cost of producing an
additional payment  transaction  is fully reflected  in its price.  This enables  payers  to demand
payment  services  up to the point where  the extra  benefits  equal  the extra  resource  costs. However,
two practical  considerations  intervene. First,  it is difficult to accurately  measure  marginal  cost in
practice. Second,  since scale  economies  exist  for payment  services  (and scale  diseconomies  are
rare),  marginal  cost  pricing  would consistently  under-recover  the full costs  of production.
The cost recovery  problem is illustrated  in Figure  1.  Scale  economies  exist at payment
volume Ql.  Setting  price (P)  equal  to marginal  cost  at MC1  would thus  give P = MC1 < AC1, so
the difference  between  average  and marginal  cost,  times payment  volume,  would be  the value of
costs  not recovered  (i.e., unrecovered  costs = (AC1  - MC1)*Q1). Over-recovery  of costs  would
occur  in the rare  event  of scale  diseconomies  (rising  average  cost)  since,  at volume  Q2, P = MC2
>  AC2.  Only in the special  case  of no scale  economies  or diseconomies,  where marginal  and
average  costs  are  equal  (so  price  also  equals  average  cost  at point 3), would cost  recovery  not be a
problem.'°
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10  It may  seem  that  a natural  monopoly  exists  in supplying  payment  services  if scale  economies  at a single  processing
facility would not be exhausted  even  if it supplied  the entire  market. However,  unless  a country  is very  small,  the extra
transportation  expense  (and  delayed  availability  of funds)  associated  with transporting  paper-based  payments  to and  from
a single  processing  facility will  typically offset  the savings  from scale  economies  at a single centralized  facility.  A
different  result  applies  to electronic  payments  today  since  communication  costs  to and from a single  facility have  been
falling while scale  economies  remain  unchanged.  Thus  electronic  payments  are  close  to being  a natural  monopoly  while
paper  payments  are  not (unless  the country  is  small).10
Optimal departure from  marginal cost pricing.  With  scale economies in  payment
operations,  a departure  from marginal  cost pricing that comes close to  delivering the same
information  for efficient  resource  allocation  is to relate  the degree  to which price exceeds  marginal
cost  to the size of the own price elasticity  of demand  for payments  (h). Here price is determined
from (P  -MC)/P  = - 1/h." When  demand  is inelastic,' 2 price  can  exceed  marginal  cost  and recover
a larger portion of total costs (or even over-recover  total costs),  but not have much effect on
reducing  quantity demanded. This preserves  the cost reducing  effects  from scale  economies  and
supplies  revenues  to cross-subsidize  other  services.
Many banks implement  pricing in this manner,  using their best guess  as to  the price
elasticity  of demand  (equivalent  to a judgment  regarding  the likely sensitivity  of payment  users  to
changes  in prices). The U.S.  central  bank,  an institution  that processes  a relatively  large  volume  of
retail payments  in competition with banks, prices some of  its payment services  using such
judgments  and  with the restriction  (by law)  that all costs  are  recovered,  even  those  that would have
been  earned  as  profits  by a private  sector  supplier.
To recover  all payment  costs,  however,  requires  some  cross-subsidization  within or among
payment  services.  Those  separately  priced  services  with scale  economies  and elastic  demands  will
under-recover  their expenses,  requiring  other services  with less  or no scale  economies  to over-
recover  their  costs  in order  for there  to be  an  overall  cost-revenue  match  for payment  services.  The
need to over-recover  in some  areas,  however,  provides  an opportunity  for "cream  skimming"  on
the part of other  payment  suppliers.  Competitors  who merely  price  according  to their average  cost
will both recoup  all their expenses  and have  a competitive  advantage  over  the supplier  who cross-
subsidizes. As payment  volume shifts  to these  lower price competitors,  the ability of the cross-
subsidizing  supplier  to obtain  an overall  cost-revenue  match  is impaired. Ultimately,  this can  force
the cross-subsidizing  supplier to  lower or eliminate the cross-subsidy  or see its market share
reduced.
The difficulty in accurately  determining  payment  demand  elasticities  prior to implementing
a pricing  structure,  the need  for cross-subsidization  when scale  economies  exist (as  is common  in
many  payment  services),  and  the possibility  of cream-skimming  by competitors  are  the three main
problems  with this pricing method. These  problems  do not arise with two-part average  cost
pricing.
Average  cost,  two-part,  and benefit-flow pricing.  Average cost pricing is easy to
implement:  average  costs  are not difficult to determine  and all costs  can be recovered  without
" h is measured  as  the percent  change  in the volume  of  payment  service  demanded  divided  by the  percent  change  in
its price. h is negative  because  quantity  demanded  tends  to fall as  price rises,  so  -1/h  is a positive  value. The  equation
shown  is  also  known  as  the inverse  elasticity  rule  or market  sensitive  pricing.
2  Demand  is inelastic  when  h <  1.0  in absolute  value,  so  - 1/h is  larger  the more  inelastic  is demand  (recall  that the
value  of h is  negative,  so  -l/h becomes  positive).11
cross-subsidization.  If adopted,  average  cost pricing  is most  appropriate  for consumer  payers  since
their payment  volume is relatively  small but the number  of users  is large  (making  a simple price
structure  a virtue).
When payment  volumes are large but the number  of users  is small, as is the case  for
business,  the average  cost of a payment  service  is best divided up into two separately  priced
components. In two-part pricing, one price reflects  the average  fixed cost of providing the
payment  service  while a second  price reflects  the average  variable cost.  Two-part  pricing, by
distinguishing  costs  and prices that may fall with volume from those  that do not, is the most
accurate  way for costs  to be reflected  in prices. This is equivalent  to having  a fixed charge  (per
account serviced,  per batch of  payments  from a single payer, etc.) plus a volume-related  fee
(reflecting  average  variable  costs)  for each payment  processed.  The net effect  is that a different
"tprice" will apply to each payer  who initiates  a different  volume of payments,  a "price" that will
reflect  the scale  economies  realized  in production." 3 In this way, the lower costs  associated  with
high volume use  are  appropriately  passed  on to users  with high volumes  (and  vice versa  for low
volume users)  so  that cross-subsidization  among  different  volume users  is minimized. In such  an
environment,  prices  are  said  to be sustainable  and  opportunities  for cream  skimming  on the part of
other  payment  suppliers  is minimized.
In  summary,  two-part pricing is  used to  discriminate among payment service users
according  to the volume of services  they demand  and thereby accurately  matches  the cost of
processing  their different  payment  volumes  with the price they are charged. As volume of use  is
the most  important  distinguishing  characteristic  among  payment  users  when scale  economies  exist,
two-part  pricing  is usually  all that is needed  for prices  to be sustainable  (Weinberg,  1994).
To the extent that other important characteristics  among users  can be identified and
measured,  such as demand  elasticity  or a splitting  of the benefit of making  a payment  between
payer  and payee,  two-part  prices  can be  adjusted  to assure  sustainability.  The latter  case  has  led to
benefit-flow  pricing  where two-part  prices are split between  payer and payee according  to  a
judgment  of how much  each  party  gains  from a transaction.  This  not only is equitable,  but reduces
a free-rider  problem  if a party  who clearly  benefits  from a transaction  does  not bear  any costs  (and
so has  an incentive  to overuse  payment  resources).  As is described  below, benefit-flow  pricing is
used  by the U.S.  central  bank  to price its  wire transfer  and  ACH  payment  services.
Other  pricing  methods.  Electric  utilities  use  peak-load  or time-of-day  pricing  to cover  the
additional  investment  needed  to build excess  generating  capacity  used  only when demand  is at its
peak. This pricing  method  allocates  more  fixed  cost  to times  of peak  demand,  so price is higher  at
the peak  but lower when demand  falls  and fewer  and less  expensive  generators  can  supply  all the
'3  In effect, the fixed fee is spread  over a number  of individual  payments  and, when combined  with the (likely
constant)  average  variable  cost  per  payment,  results  in an overall  'price' per  payment  that falls  as  payment  volume  rises.12
needed  output.  Peak-load  pricing  tends  to stabilize  the fluctuation  in demand  over the day and
eliminates  the cross-subsidy  which would otherwise  occur  if a single  price  were charged  regardless
of the level  of demand. Peak-load  pricing  could be used  in situations  were  the volume  of payment
instrument  use  varies  considerably  over  time (over  24 hours  or day of the month). If substantial
excess  payment  processing  capacity  has  to be maintained,  for example,  to handle monthly bill
payments  over  and above  the capacity  needed  for daily point-of-sale  transactions,  then a peak-load
pricing approach  could be used  to more  fairly apportion  the costs between  these  two types of
transactions.
An alternative  pricing method,  one that is not recommended,  is par value  pricing.  Here
price is tied to the value of the payment  being made rather  than to the actual resource  cost of
making  the transaction. The only time par  value pricing is justified is when the risk of monetary
loss  associated  with making  a payment  is proportional  to the value of the payment  made. While
this can  occur  if a payment  supplier  is providing  (daylight  or overnight)  credit
to a payer in addition to processing  a payment,  this usually  occurs  only on some large value
payment  networks  (e.g.,  Fedwire  in the U.S.). The more usual  case  is to cover this risk of loss
through alternative  means  (collateral  on CHIPS  and CHAPS,  intraday  borrowings  on BOJ-NET)
while still charging  a per  transaction  fee  based  on the processing  cost incurred.
On small  value retail payment  networks,  the risk of loss  is correspondingly  lower.  Here
legislation,  case  law, and payment  rule-making  have  clearly set out the rights and liabilities of
payers,  payees,  and their agents  in a payment  transaction.  These  have  usually  been  sufficient  to
minimize  losses  from settlement  risk  for retail  payments  so  no value-related  fee is warranted.
6.  From marginal costs to prices
The regulation  of the supply  and demand  for payment  services  implies  that processing  and
operating centers and telecommunication  networks are constructed  and  located in  optimal
locations  to meet  the changing  demand.  Like it happens  with other public utilities (particularly
power  generation  and  distribution),  the demand  for payment  services  will in part  be shaped  by the
prices  charged  to users,  while such  prices  should reflect  the costs  of providing  the services.  The
system  forms  a consistent  whole, ideally  a self  regulating  loop.
As indicated  above,  each component  of the services  offered  should ideally be sold at a
price reflecting  its marginal  cost. However,  due to difficulties  in predicting  accurately  the need  for
processing  capacity  and customer  demand  an optimum system  could be achieved  through the
posting  of prices for alternative  scenarios,  with the aim of equalizing  the prices charged  to the
relevant  marginal  costs. One particularly  important  very short-term  application  includes  the intra-
day pricing  of payment  services.  A pricing  strategy  that influences  user  behavior  to evenly  spread
usage  of the system  throughout  the operating  day and  thus reduce  the required  peak  hour capacity13
of the system  with its associated  lower  capital  requirement  may be necessary  and should  be
recognized  from  the  outset.
Figure  2: Regulating  supply  and  demand  for  payment  services
Demand  CaDacitv
Forecast  Planning
(Demand Management)  (Supuly  Management)
Prices  Mareginal !  Prices  r  ~~~~Costs
Part II of the document  deals  with the more practical  question  of moving from costs  to
prices,  providing a discussion  of the informational  requirements,  implementation  problems,  and
some  experiences  and examples  in pricing  payment  services.
PART II
7. Information  needed  to price  payments  and  problems  in implementation
Information needed.  Cost  and payment  volume  information  are needed  to properly  price
payment  services.  Importantly,  prices  should  generally  be set  to recover  all costs  since  this results
in proper use  of payment  services  by consumers,  businesses,  and banks. One of the best  pricing
methodologies  is two-part pricing as  this pricing  structure  will (a)  reflect  the likely scale  economies
in payment  processing  and (b) pass  the benefits  of high  volume  operation  on to those  high  volume
users  who generate  the economies  of scale.
The implementation  of two-part  pricing  is illustrated  in Table  A3, which follows procedures
on how the U.S.  central  bank develops  its payment  pricing structure. The first step is to obtain
estimates  or projections  of total variable  cost (TVC) and total fixed cost (TFG)  by each of the i
payment  service  categories  to be offered. TVCi reflects  the direct costs  (wages,  fringe benefits,
supplies,  transportation,  etc.)  incurred  in producing  the ith payment  service.  TFCi  represents  (1)  the
annual  cost of leased/rented  facilities  or equipment  plus (2) the depreciated  value of any wholly-14
owned capital equipment or facilities (data processing  equipment,  computers,  furniture, and
buildings)  plus (3)  any rise in replacement  over  historical  cost  of the owned  equipment  or facilities
(approximated  by the inflation  rate  times  the  total  value  of the purchased  capital  goods).
When one payment  service  jointly uses  or shares  the same  facilities  or equipment  with
another  service,  the costs  have  to be properly  apportioned  between  them. A standard  approach  to
dividing up jointly allocated  costs  is to apportion  the shared  costs  according  to the percent of
floorspace  used  for each  service  when dealing  with occupancy  expenses  or the percent  of time
each  service  uses  a shared  computer  for equipment  expenses.
The second  step  in determining  two-part  prices  is  to estimate  the volume  of payments  to be
processed  for the ij  payment  service  (Vi,prcessed),  the number  of files submitted  to be processed  as
batched  payments  (Vi,file),  and the number  of payment  accounts  serviced  in real time (Vi,accounts).
From  this, it is possible  to approximate  the two-part  prices  for smaller  value retail payments  which
are normally  processed  in batch  mode:  Pi = TVCVii,pocessed  for the price which is to cover  variable
expenses  and Pi = TFCVi,file  for the price  which covers  fixed expenses.  Similarly,  the approximate
two-part  prices  for larger  value business  and financial market  payments  that are usually  made  in
real-time (or at least  on an expedited basis)  would  be: Pi =  TVCiNi,processed  for the price covering
variable expenses  and Pj = TFCjN,account  for the price covering fixed expenses. In effect, this is how
the two-part  prices shown in Table 4 were derived, except  that TVC and TFC also included a
reasonable  return  on invested  capital  (or  equity)  and taxes  which would have  been  paid on profits.
Problems in implementation.  The main difficulty will  be in obtaining  accurate  payment
cost  and  volume data. Initially,  this will involve  some  educated  guesses.  However,  once a proper
cost  accounting  system  is in place  and experience  is gained  in projecting  payment  volume growth,
the process  will stabilize  and more  accurate  estimates  of costs  and  volumes-and  hence  prices-will
be obtained.  For operational  management  purposes,  it  is recommended  that procedures  be
developed  and implemented  that will measure  and record  payment  volumes  and values  processed,
capacity utilization, and the extent to  which quality problems  are encountered  (e.g.,  delayed
payments,  payments  to the wrong  account,  and  other  payment  errors).
8. Cost  management  and  control
A justifiable  pricing  structure  based  on acceptable  cost recovery  principles  requires  that all
relevant  capital/set-up  costs  and operating  costs  are known and are managed  on a rigorous  basis
throughout  the system  life-cycle.
The capital/set-up  costs,  which typically may be depreciated  over a five year period are
those costs  incurred by the service  provider prior to full system  operation.  These  costs  can be
significant  and  should  be  carefully  managed  and controlled.  Such  costs  will include:
*  Site  Construction: facilities, security equipment, telecommunication equipment
(including  taxes  and import  duties)15
*  Computer  Equipment:  including  taxes  and import  duties
*  Application  System(s):  design,  development,  and  testing
*  Management  and  other  staff  costs:  directly  attributable  to system  set-up.
Annual operating  costs  will  include all operating,  maintenance,  customer  support
and administrative  and  other management  costs  incurred  in providing  the services  on an on-going
basis.  Such  costs  include:
*  Lease  of space
*  Equipment  (rent  and  maintenance)
+  Depreciation
*  Staff  costs
+  Administrative  costs  (direct  and indirect)
*  Management  costs  (direct  and indirect)
+  Corporate  and  other  taxes
Direct  administrative  and management  costs  are  those  that are  directly  within the control of
the service  provider  organization.  Indirect  costs,  are  those  associated  with services  provided,  say  by
the parent  central bank organization,  such  as internal  auditing  and accounting,  when the service
provider  is  the central  bank.  In  all  cases, a well  designed budgeting, cost accounting and
management  information  system  will be required  to both manage  costs  and provide  the basic  data
for building  the service  pricing  structure.
The specific  treatment  of capital investment  depreciation  will  depend on the prevailing
accounting  rules and are not discussed  in this paper.  As a general  principle, capital investments
should  be depreciated  over  the useful  life of the asset.  Useful  life is  the period  over  which the asset
is to be effectively  used  by the service  provider  and may  therefore  be shorter  than its physical  life.
Typically, the depreciation  period for  computers  and other electronic equipment is usually
between  five and ten years. Factors  which must  be considered  in determining  useful  life include
obsolescence  arising  from technological  changes  or improvements  in production  techniques.  If the
equipment  becomes  obsolete  due to technological  changes  during  the period  determined  to be  the
useful  life at the beginning  of a period,  the book  value  of the equipment  should  be reduced  and  the
depreciation  accelerated  over the remainder  of the current assessment  of  its useful life.  This
concept  is particularly  important  when  considering  the pace  of change  in technology  and its impact
on determining  realistic  payment  system  costs.
After the initial capitalization,  the payments  systems  will need  to be continually updated
and enhanced. Any additional  capital  expenditure  should  be treated  in a similar manner  to that
described  above.
The distinction  between  direct and indirect  operating  costs  mentioned  above  is important
as direct costs  can usually  be controlled  by individuals  within the payments  systems  area,  while16
indirect costs are managed and controlled outside the  immediate influence of  the  area.
Responsibility  for controlling direct costs,  both fixed and variable as discussed  in Part I of this
paper, should be individual accountabilities  assigned  to  nominated  operating  managers.  They
should  be required  to manage  costs  within budget  and challenged  over  time to reduce  the cost  per
item  processed  to ensure  that user  fees  are  optimized.
Key features of an acceptable pricing/price structure.  Discussion  with commercial
bank users  of  payment systems  in several  countries  strongly indicates  that one of  the most
important features  of any charging system  is that the final  price structure  should be simple.
Commercial  banks  and other  users  should  be able  to determine  the impact  of the charges  on their
profits  and should be able to monitor costs  as they arise  during any period.  The prices  should
therefore be established  prior to the beginning  of  appropriately  defined calendar periods  and
should remain in force throughout  the period. Any under-  or over-recovery  of costs  may, if full
recovery  is  the objective,  be used  in determining  the prices  for the next  period.
In a typical situation  in a developing  economy  more  than  one payment  service  is planned
for introduction.  For  example,  the on-going  World Bank  supported  reform  initiatives  in China,  Viet
Nam  and Mauritius  will result  in the introduction  of discrete  computer  based  systems  to process
both large  value/time  critical transactions  using  a gross  settlement  method  as well as batched  files
of low value payments  using  a net  settlement  method. Situations  also arise  in which the planned
data  communications  services  will support  both payment  instruction  processing  as well as other
types  of transactions,  such  as,  securities  trading  instructions  and credit  card authorization  requests.
Although  several  aspects  of the services  are  quite discrete,  they will utilize specific  infrastructural
items  on a shared  cost basis. Each  of the services  have  different  commercial  features,  and in some
cases  will be used  by different  customers.  To encourage  the customers  to use  each  of the services
in a cost effective  manner,  a system  of discretionary  pricing may be required. Different  features
have  different  associated  costs  and  therefore  should  be priced  differently. The primary  objective  is
to establish  an overall price structure  that is fair to all participants. The major components  are
discussed  in the following paragraphs.
*  Entry costs: The most  common  form of discretionary  pricing  is the use  of an entry cost
or initial membership  fee. In systems  which are owned and operated  by the central
bank the entry cost is typically by way of a fixed fee, while where the systems  are
owned  and  operated  by the participants  entry  fees  are  frequently  based  on a percentage
of equity  determined  using  expected  transaction  volumes.  The  entry cost  can  also be  an
effective  mechanism  for passing  some  of the costs  of development  to the users  and,
where appropriate,  may also be used  to discourage  low volume users  from having
direct access  to the service. Entry pricing is usually used in addition to per item
charges.
*  Service level costs:  In the example  of China  mentioned  above,  three  primary  payment
systems  - bulk paper;  bulk electronic,  and  high  value items  - will be made  available  by17
the People's  Bank  of China  (PBOC)  for use  by the commercial  banks.  The  technological
design anticipates  using the same  data communications  network for the latter two
systems.  However,  the base  product  functionality  of the two electronic  systems  differs
substantially  according  to the required response  times, security and other features.
These  differences  should  be reflected  in the pricing structure  in line with the costs  of
providing these  different  features.  In addition to the different basic  features  of each
system  it is also clear  that the two systems  have  differing levels  of service,  for instance
the high  value  system  allows  for direct  electronic  interface,  voice interface  and batched
electronic or paper based  interface  via the branches  of the PBOC. Each  of these
different  features  should  be separately  priced  and  perhaps  added  to the unit price  of the
basic  service.
*  Incentives:  Various  forms of incentive  pricing schemes  can be used  to influence  the
behavior  of the user.
High volume discounts:  The  pricing  structure  could include high volume  discounts
to  encourage  the participating  banks to  use the system. The discounts  might be
activated  once a previously  agreed  minimum  transaction  volume for each participant
bank  or bank  branch  has  been  achieved.  For  example,  it is not untypical  to base  overall
costs  on some  percent  utilization  of overall  system  capacity,  say  sixty percent.  So,  if the
actual  system  utilization  is in excess  of sixty percent  the service  provider  will be able  to
give discounts  and still recover  costs.
Minimum daily usage  charge: A minimum daily charge might be introduced  to
encourage  subscribers  to use  the system.  However  the fixed  charge  should  not be set  at
a level  which is so high as  to discourage  the commercial  banks  from using  the system.
This minimum charge  could  be presented  as a fixed annual subscription  fee to ail
participants.
Subsidized price structures:  Subsidized  prices may be required during the initial
implementation  period  as a basis  for positively  encouraging  use  of newly introduced
systems.  The  subsidy  can  be applied  using  a variety  of approaches  such  as  no charges
at all, discounts  based  on volumes  (principally  based  upon long  term (high  volume)  per
item costs),  or full cost  recovery  with annual  rebates  to high  volume users.  The level  of
the subsidy  should  be considered  carefully.  In essence,  it should be pitched  at a level
that encourages  use, is  affordable,  yet does not  institutionalize  the  concept of
subsidization.  Some form of  gradually reducing subsidy might be appropriate  to
overcome  a low transaction  volume  start-up  situation.
Based  on the above,  it would seem  appropriate  that an initial price structure  is developed
around  one or more  of the following  four core  prices.18
+  Entry fees.  All new subscribers  to a particular  payment  service  could be charged  an
entry fee.  The fee would be set at a price which is designed  to recover a part of
previous  capital  expenditure.  The price  should  be motivational  and  encourage  users  to
be  selective  in the services  they use.
*  Annual fees:  All subscribers  could pay an annual fee which is set according  to the
services  utilized. The  purpose  of this fee  is to encourage  the users  to be selective  in the
service  they require  and/or provide  lower per item fees  to encourage  marginal  usage.
These  fees  can  be used  to off-set  some  of the capital  expenditure.
*  Per item prices: This is the principal  mechanism  for cost recovery  from the payments
system.  Prices  are  set by transaction  volume  according  to the nature  of the transaction
and the features  of the service. The system  selected  for use may have  a number  of
optional  features  such  as  security,  guaranteed  finality,  ability to retrieve  copies  of past
transactions  and ability to  generate  specific management  reports.  It is therefore
appropriate  to have  a range  of prices  for different  basic  services.  In addition  there  may
be volume discounts  to  encourage  high volumes of traffic. The two  part pricing
concepts  discussed  in Part I and illustrated  in Table 4 should be considered  as it
represents  a practical  and fair method  of recovering  fixed  and  variable  processing  costs.
*  Ad-hoc fees and charges:  There may be some service  that the participating  bank
requires  such  as software  for upgrading  his interface  with the payments  system. Any
such  assistance  or service  should  be outside  the price structure  and should  be priced
with the participants'  agreement.
Indicative cost recovery framework:  Pricing  and cost recovery  related issues  are not
simple  or straight  forward.  The  decisions  made  must be  tailored  to the specific  situation  and must
reflect  both  funding  and operational  realities.  In particular,  as many  payment  system  improvement
initiatives  are  funded  initially through  re-payable  loans  or credits,  attention  should  be  given  to ways
in which these loans and any associated  interest  charges  might be re-paid  from user fees. A
situation  may also arise,  for example,  in which a central  bank may have full ownership  of the
payments  system  at inception, but might choose  to  replace  its ownership with the eventual
ownership  of the users.  The  situation  is  further  complicated  in that new users  of the systems  will be
admitted  over  time, thus in the interests  of fairness,  the pricing  arrangements  must  ensure  that  these
new users  do not get more  favorable  treatment  than  the initial users.
The purpose  of the following discussion  is to illustrate  how some  of these  issues  might be
considered  and addressed.  The described  framework  is not put forward  as a rigorous  treatment  of
the associated  issues  but is put forward  to demonstrate  how the basis  for pricing  decisions  might  be
calculated.  The primary objective of the discussion  is to  create  awareness  and stimulate the
detailed  analysis  that must  take  place  on a country  by country,  system  by system  basis.19
For purposes  of illustration,  it is assumed  that the central  bank  owner of the new systems
has  decided  to pursue  a planned growth cost  recovery  strategy  in which, the price will be set to
recover  operating  costs  and provide  funds  for future purchases  of essential  capital  equipment.  For
illustration  purposes,  we have  assumed  that several  payment  applications  will be covered  by the
new arrangements,  as is the case  in China,  Viet Nam, Mauritius  and in many  other developing
economies.  Each  of these  applications  will require  a different  price  as their cost  structures  will be
different.  Despite  these  differences,  the formula  to be used  to determine  the price  will be  the same.
The differences  will be reflected  in the associated  specific  cost  and volume  data.  This  formula  will
be  based  on the  following generic  elements:
Average  cost
Element  from  the  3-year  forecast
Direct  operating  costs  A
Depreciation  of equipment  and  other  assets  used  solely
in operating  the  system  B
Proportion  of shared  operating  costs  C
Proportion  of depreciation  of equipment  and  other  assets
used  iointly  in operating  the  sVstems  D
Operating  costs  E = A + B + C + D
Start-up  loan  repayment  provision  F
Planned  growth  element  G
Total  costs  to  recover  H = E + F  + G
Average  number  of  transactions  forecast  over  a  three-year
period  x
Per  item  tariff  for  the  year  H/X
The  entries  referenced  in the above  table  are  explained  in the following paragraphs.
A. Direct  operating  costs
Direct  operating  costs  are  the costs  which can  be identified  as being  incurred  exclusively  to
provide  the service  being costed.  For the purpose  of this generalized  formula,  depreciation  has
been excluded from the direct costs and separately  analyzed (Depreciation  of  Equipment).
Therefore,  where loans  are made to fund specific projects  which can be identified,  the interest
should  be  attributed  to the payments  system  using  the loan.
B. Depreciation  of equipment  and  other  assets  used  solely  in operating  the  system
Certain  equipment  and other  assets  will be used  exclusively  for the purpose  of providing
the services costed. All  assets  will  be depreciated  over their useful lives and the  related
depreciation  cost will be treated  as  an expense  each  year.  Where  assets  can be identified  for the20
exclusive  use in any one particular  system,  the depreciation  will  be separately  recorded  and
included  at this point in the  formula.
C. Proportion  of shared  operating  costs
In all operations  of this nature  there  are  several  costs  which can not be easily  identified  as
solely arising  from one area  of the operations,  but are  the result  of the combined  operations.  An
example  of this type of cost would be the central  processing  unit and some  telecommunications
links.  These  shared  costs  should  be  allocated  between  the systems  in an  equitable  (or  other  manner
determined  by management).  Activity based  costing  principles  could be used to determine  the
costs  attributable  to each  service.
An important  element  of these  shared  costs  will be interest  to be paid on any loans  which
are used  to fund joint projects.  As noted  above,  where loans  have  been  obtained  to fund specific
projects  the interest  should  be  considered  a direct  cost  of that project  while in all other  cases  it will
be  a shared  cost  to be allocated  using  the selected  methodology.
D. Proportion  of depreciation  of equipment  and  other  assets
used  jointly  in operating  the systems
As noted above  there  will inevitably  be some  equipment  and other assets  which are used
jointly  by all systems.  The basis  of allocation of costs should be determined using the same
methodology,  as  selected  under  Proportion  of Shared  Operating  Costs,  to allocated  costs.
E. Start-up  loan  repayment  provision
To develop  the payment  system  the project requires  substantial  funding which, we have
assumed,  will initially be provided  by the central  bank  and has  for the purpose  of this generalized
formula been  treated  as  a repayable  loan.  We have  further  assumed  that the loan should  be repaid
by the system  users  over  a period  of time, yet to be  determined.  The  following  formula  can be used
to determine  the element  in the price  which is related  to the loan:
Pmt  (P 
[(1  +i)  - 1]
Where:
P  =  The  principal  to be repaid
Pmt  =  The  amount  of the repayment  to be included  in the main cost  formula
n  =  The number  of years  remaining  until repayment  date  (payment  at the end of
each  period)
i  =  The  annual  rate  of interest  which will be  earned  over  the period  to repayment21
The above  assumes  that the element  of each payment  which relates  to the loan will be
invested  in a secure  account,  at the end of each  period,  such  as  guaranteed  (insured)  government
securities,  and is fully auditable. A method  used  in some  countries  is to treat loan repayment  as
equity in the operating  cooperative  and any new entrant  will be required  to purchase  such  equity
from the existing  members  based  on their anticipated  traffic  volumes.  In this way, the initial users
will  not be unduly penalized  by having  to repay  the loan during the start-up  period while new
entrants  make  no contribution  to past  repayments.  The size  of each  participants  equity stake  could
be  adjusted  annually  based  on  the traffic  volumes  of the previous  year.
F.  Planned  growth element
It is assumed  that the cost recovery  system  should  provide  funds  for future investments  to
expand  or enhance  the systems.  The following formula can be used  to determine  the element  in
the price related  to future  investments:
p2mt  =  (Eil * i)
*(1  +i)  -1]
where:
Fl  - The  anticipated  cost  of future  investments
Pmt  - The  amount  to be included  in the cost  formula
n  = The number  of years  remaining  until investment  date
i  = The annual rate  of interest  which will  be earned  over the period until the
investment  is required
The above  assumes  that the element  of each payment,  made at the end of each period,
which relates  to the future investments  will be invested  in a secure  account  such  as a guaranteed
(insured)  government  securities,  and is fully auditable. It is probable that over time several
investment  projects  will  be identified and the above  formula should be used  for each defined
project.  In addition  the formula  has  assumed  that any inflationary  effects  have  been  accounted  for
in the cost  of the Future  Investment  (Fl).
G.  Average  number  of transactions  over, say,  a three  year period
The  number  of transactions  from which the costs  are recovered  needs  to be determined  in
advance  of the year  so  all the  system  users  are  aware  of the charges  for the following  year.
Therefore,  the forecast  system  usage  should  be estimated  through  discussions  with users
before  the  year  begins.  The  above  formula  assumes  a three  year  average  to ensure  that  the costs  are
reasonable  and  can  be maintained  at broadly  the same  level  over  the period.22
H. Per  item  price  for the  year
The per item price for the year  is determined  by dividing  the total costs  by the anticipated
total  traffic  volume.
As mentioned  at the outset, the framework  described  above is not intended to  be a
comprehensive  treatment  of pricing  issues  from an  accounting  perspective.  Neither  does  it cover  all
issues  that  might  be relevant  in a specific  case.  Clearly,  a number  of specific  management  decisions
will have  to be made  in regards  to the operation  and modification  of the above  formula for price
estimation  purposes.  Examples  of such  issues  are  as  follows:
During  the start-up  years,  it may  be  necessary  to under  recover  the actual  costs  to encourage  usage
of the system.  Any such  under  recovery  will need  to be built into future  pricing  formulae  once  the
systems  are  established  and  traffic  volumes  are  at a level  where  full recovery  is practicable;
*  Rigorous  management  accounting  systems  will be required  to identify,  capture  and record  the
costs  actually incurred  in operating  the systems.  In the initial implementation  period, these
costs  will have  to be estimated  based  probably  on the experience  of operating  similar  systems
in other  countries  adjusted  as  appropriate  to reflect  local  conditions;
+  There  will be a need  to establish  a system  of entry  fee calculations  based  on projected  system
usage  to ensure  that new entrants  contribute  to the loan repayment  fund  and the investment  in
existing  and future equipment  and assets.  A possible  approach  is to use  equity as a means  of
guaranteeing  user  rights.  The cost  of this equity  could be based  on a valuation  of the assets  at
the date  of entry which would include  both  the investment  reserve  and the value  of the loans
less any  repayments.  The  importance of  this  element in  the  equation must not  be
underestimated  and as the exchange  of  loan capital for  equity has implications  on the
ownership  of the future "operating  cooperative"  it should be resolved  before finalizing any
decisions  on the specifics  of the pricing  formula  to be used. Professional  accounting  advice
must  be sought  when addressing  this issue;
+  Rebates  may need  to be applied  for over-recovery  of costs  in a period. However  as costs,  in
the above  example,  are  calculated  using  a three  year  average,  the rebates  could be calculated
in arrears.  The exact basis  for calculating  rebates  should be defined in the user  agreement
documents;
*  The formula does not take into account  any taxation  issues  which might arise on either the
expenses  or interest  earned  on investment/  loan  accounts.  In addition  the formula  assumes  that
no taxation  will be  payable  on the receipts  from users;  and  finally
+  The formula  takes  no account  of the potential  to use  differential  pricing for different  levels  of
service  nor does it consider  the use  of differential  pricing to influence  behavior  amongst  the
users.23
9. Experience  in pricing  payment  services:  banks,  payees,  and  central  banks
Bank  payment  costs  and  prices. Bank  costs  per transaction  for different  types  of U.S.
payment  instruments  are shown  in Table  2.  These  range  from $.15  for an electronic  (ACH)
payment  to a weighted  average  of $.41 per check. Credit card costs  are higher  still ($2.45)  but
include the extra service  of extending  credit as well as being a payment,  and so is not directly
comparable  with the other  instruments  shown. Deposit  account  maintenance  expenses  are  shown
separately  since they would apply regardless  of which payment  instrument  is used. As noted
earlier,  consumer  payors  do not face  these  differential  bank payment  costs  as explicit fees  when
choosing  an instrument  (although  business  payors  do because  of their larger  payment  volume).
Table  2: Average  bank  cost  of payment  services  (United  States,  1994)
Percent  of check
Payment  instrument  Average  cost  operating expense
(In US$)  (%)
Account  maintenance  (monthly)  $7.42  36%
Paper-based  (check):
Payor  bank  activity
On-us  debit  0.27  28
Check  cashing  0.48  10
Issue  official  check  0.80  1
Payee  bank  activity
Deposit  0.55  11
Transit  check  deposit  0.15  14
Volume  weighted  average  $0.41  1
Electronic:
Credit card ')  2.45  na
ACH  0.15  na
ATM  withdrawal  0.43  na
Source:  Federal  Reserve  System  (1994),  demand  deposit  and  other  functions.  Data  are  for the  average
medium  sized  bank  with deposits  of $200  million  to $1 billion.
(1) Credit  card  expenses  include  both  payment  processing  and  a loan  component  associated  with
outstanding  balances  (which  incorporates  loan losses  and  the  opportunity  cost  of funds  needed
to finance  unpaid  balances).
Norway has  gone  further  and implemented  policies  designed  to shift consumer  as well as
business  use of paper-based  (giro and check) payments  to lower cost electronic transactions (giro
and point-of-sale).  Norwegian  banks  have  been encouraged  by the central bank to institute  per
transaction  fees  that increasingly  reflect  the differential  bank costs  of producing  different  types of
payments.  Currently,  48% of bank payment  instrument  expenses  are covered  through  transaction
fees  whereas  only 13%  was  so  covered  in 1988  (Flatraaker  and Robinson,  1995). Previously,  bank24
payment  expenses  were largely  recouped  through  earnings  on float by debiting  a payor's  account
one or more  days  earlier  than necessary  to make  a payment,  and earning  interest  on these  funds
before  a payee's  account  was  credited.
Average  prices  for different  bank payment  services  in Norway  are shown  in Table  3 along
with their average  cost and the percent  of total cost recovered  in the price.  In the future, float
revenues  are to be reduced  further and an even larger  share  of bank costs  are to be recovered
through explicit fees. The goal is to reflect  better the true resource  cost of using the different
payment  instruments.  This  enables  users,  who demand  payment  services,  to make  more informed
decisions  on which instrument  has  the greatest  net benefit,  and hence  which instrument  is best
used  for point-of-sale  or bill payments.  It also enables  payment  suppliers  to guide users  toward
those instruments  which have the lowest resource  costs,  reducing bank expenses. The clear
implication  in Table 3 is that electronic  payments  have  both a lower cost and a lower price than
paper-based  payments.
Table  3: Average  bank  prices  and  costs  of paper-based  and  electronic  payments  (Norway,  1994)
Price as a
Payment  instrument  Average  price  Average  ibank cost  % of cost
(In US$)  (In US$)  %
Paper-based:
Mail giro  $0.49  $1.06  46%
Giro collection box  0.71  1.55  46
Giro at the counter  1.20  2.26  53
Giro cash payment  1.27  2.54  50
Check  0.92  2.15  43
Electronic
Direct debit:  No notification  0.14  0.49  29
With  notification  0.42  0.92  46
Direct deposit:  No notification  0.14  0.21  67
With  notification  0.35  0.56  63
EFTPOS  (debit  card at point-of-sale)  0.46  0.63  73
ATM withdrawal  0.25  0.49  51
Source: Flatraaker  and  Robinson  (1995),  table 3: exchange  rate  is NOK709=$1.
Explicit  payment pricing in other countries.  The clear  trend in recovering  bank payment
costs in  Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,  Netherlands,  South Africa,
Switzerland,  and Sweden  has  been  to implement  explicit pricing  for payment  services  (Llewellyn
and Drake, 1993).'4  Two-part pricing is often used, where a transaction fee is combined with  a
14 The  U.K.  is  an exception  to this  trend,  as  is  the U.S.25
monthly or quarterly  fixed fee (covering  account  maintenance  expenses  and/or providing for a
fixed number  of "free"  payments  to be made  before  transaction  fees  are  assessed).  Payment  prices
are  also  often  differentiated  and reflect  the lower  cost  of electronic  payments.
Bank pricing of consumer versus business payments.  In marketing  bank payment  services,
the typical arrangement  for consumer  payments  has been to offer different payment service
"packages".  For consumers,  these  packages  are usually  differentiated  according  to the payment
volume initiated,  the interest  paid (if any)  on a transaction  account,  and the choice  of using  bank
personnel  and paper-based  instruments  rather  than electronics  as  the main point of service  contact
for cash  withdrawal,  bill payments,  and  point-of-sale  transactions.
In contrast,  business  payments-due  to their higher volume for each payor-are  typically
separately  priced per transaction,  along with  a fixed monthly fee for  account maintenance.
Businesses  usually  have a choice of paying  these  fees  directly or holding a non-interest  earning
compensating  balance  which generates  the same  cash  flow to the bank. Since  a compensating
balance  rises  if the payor  initiates  more  payments,  it functions  exactly  like a per  transaction  fee and
provides  the same  incentive  structure.
Payee restrictions on payment  instruments.  As noted, payees  incur sometimes  large
differences  in costs  when  accepting  different  payment  instruments  (see  Table  A2). Even  so, payees
may not vary the price of the good or service  they provide  according  to the payment  instrument
used. 5 Differences  in payee  payment  costs  are often absorbed,  on average,  in the sales  price
charged. Payees,  however,  do at times  place  restrictions  on which payment  instruments  they will
accept. For example,  credit cards  are often not accepted  for payment  because  of their relatively
high  cost  to payees  or, alternatively,  a sale  has  to exceed  some  minimum  value before  a credit  card
can  be used. In other  situations,  cash  payments  above  a certain  value  are  refused  due to safety  and
fraud  reasons.
The payee  response  to the high cost  of accepting  a credit  card  payment  is largely  the result
of restrictions  imposed  by credit  card providers. Contracts  between  credit card providers  (usually
banks)  and retail payees  typically expressly  prohibit payees  from imposing  a surcharge  for payor
use  a credit card, which some  payees  would like to do because  the cost to payees  is so much
higher than accepting  other payment  instruments. Although these contracts  allow payees  to
provide  a discount  for (say)  the use  of cash  instead  of a credit  card  at the point-of-sale,  this would
require  the payee  to raise  its price so that after  the discount  it would still earn  the same  revenues.
While a discount  for the use  of certain  payment  instruments  does  occur,  it is not common.
15 An exception  to this  arrangement  occurs  when especially  large  value  payments  are to be made. In this instance,
especially  if an instrument  contains  a good  deal of float benefit for the payor (as can a check payment),  it  is not
uncommon  to negotiate  both  the  payment  method  and  the sales  price  together.26
Central bank payment costs and prices.  A selection  of prices for the main payment
services  offered by the U.S.  central bank are shown in Table 4.  As seen,  a two-part pricing
structure  is common. The first part of the price structure  reflects  the average  variable cost of
providing  the service  and is covered  through  a per item  or per  transaction  fee. The  second  part  of
the price structure  effectively  covers  the average  fixed cost of the service  or payment  activity
indicated.  The fixed cost  component  of price can  contain  labor  (normally  thought  of as  a variable
input), materials,  or an allocation  of physical  capital  - the key point is that it reflects  the fixed
elements  in providing  the service.  The fixed cost  component  of price is assessed  either each  time
the service  is used  or through  a monthly  or recurring  fee,  as is evident  in Table  4.  In addition,  for
ACH, funds,  and securities  transfers,  benefit-flow  pricing is also used. It was determined  that the
originator  or sender  of funds  benefited  by being  able  to initiate  and complete  a transaction  but also
that the receiver  of funds  benefited  by having  its account  credited. Therefore,  many  of the prices
shown  in Table  4 have  split  the item  fee evenly  between  the two parties  to a transaction.  A similar
logic applies  to checks  but, due to the historical  precedent  of placing  all the cost on the receiver
(payee)  of a check,  was  not adopted.
The  central  bank  prices  shown  recover  the total cost  of each  of the services  separately  over
time, so there  is no cross-subsidization  among  payment  services." 6 That  is, the check  service  does
not consistently  run a surplus  or deficit to subsidize  or tax one of the other services. However,
within a particular  service,  there  may  be instances  were a subset  of payment  products  offered  over-
or under-recovers  their directly allocated  costs.  Thus  there  can  be some  cross-subsidization  within
a particular  service  line (e.g.,  checks). Since  the implementation  of central  bank pricing in the
1980s,  the extent  of cross-subsidization  has  been markedly  reduced  due to cream  skimming  by
commercial  banks  who also  offer payment  services  and thus  force  the central  bank  to price closer
to actual  cost  for each  product  or lose  volume. 17
Central  bank  revenues  from providing  priced  payment  services  totaled  over  $800 million in
1996.  Because  the prices  charged  include  the imputed  expense  of taxes  and return  on invested
capital  equivalent  to that of a private  firm, the central  bank has  transferred  almost  $900 million in
"profit" to the Treasury  over  the last  10 years,  reducing  government  debt by the same  amount. As
seen in Table 5, fully three-fourths  of payment  service revenues  are associated  with checks,
reflecting  the predominant  share  of this payment  instrument  in total  transactions.
16  Central  bank  prices  are required,  by legislation,  to be set so that all direct  and indirect  costs  are recovered  over
time, including  the imputed  cost  of taxes  and  return  on invested  capital  that would have  been  incurred  if the payment
services  had  been  provided  by a  private  business  firm. Realized  tax  rates  and  returns  on capital  for a set  of representative
large  banks  are  used  in determining  these  imputed  costs.
17 The  central  bank  originally  adopted  a  pricing  structure  similar  to what  was  described  earlier  as  an optimal  departure
from marginal  cost  pricing. This  arrangement,  called 'market-sensitive'  pricing,  contained  some  cross-subsidization  and
relied on informal  estimates  of the price elasticity  of demand. As noted above,  cross-subsidization  is not viable in a
competitive  market  since  competitors  can  always  cover  their  full cost  and  still underprice  the  payment  product  in which
revenues  exceed  costs,  the  excess  revenues  of which  are  used  to subsidize  another  product  where  costs  exceed  revenues.27
Table  4: Central  bank  prices  for payment  services  (United  States,  1996)
Price  range  per item  Price  per batch of payments
Payment  service  (reflects  average  variable  cost)  (reflects  average  fixed cost)
(In US$)  (In US$)
Check
Unsorted  checks  .003  - .080  1.50  - 9.00
Presorted  checks  .003 - .012  2.50 - 11.00
Returned  checks  .100  - 1.110  1.50  - 8.00
Payor  bank  services:
MICR information  .001  - .005  5.00  - 30.00  minimum
Electronic  presentment  .001  - .0045  3.00- 14.00  minimum
Check  truncation  .010- .017  3.00-25.00  minimum
ACH  Origination  Receipt
Unsorted  deposit  .01  .01  1.75  (per  input  file submitted)
Presorted  deposit  .009  .01
Addenda  record  .003  .003  25.00  (monthly  account  servicing  fee)
Returned  payment  .04  .04
Funds  transfer
Wire transfer  .5  .5
Net settlement  1.00
Off-line  surcharge  10.00
Telephone  advice  10.00
Book-entry  securities  transfer
On-line  transfer  2.25  15.00  (monthly  account  servicing  fee)
Off-line  transfer  10.00  10.00
Electronic connection  fees
Telephone  dial up  30.00  -450.00  per  month
Dedicated  leased  line  750.00  - 2,000.00  per  month
Encryption  certification  0 - 8,000.00
Source:  Board  of Governors  of the  Federal  Reserve  System  (1997),  various  tables.  Two  additional  priced
services  are: the  collection  of definitive  securities  (bond  coupon  collection,  etc.)  and  special  cash  services
(provision  of wrapped  coin, special  packaging  of  currency,  and  cash  deposits/withdrawals  above  a
standard  number  per  month).
In order for revenues  to cover all costs,  the central bank needs to forecast the growth in the
demand for  its various services and  set prices accordingly.  First, cost projections  (including
imputed expenses)  are made for total variable cost (TVC)  and total fixed cost (TFC)  for the coming
year.  Second, the projected TVC for each product or service is divided  by an estimate of the
volume of payment items expected  to be processed  and cleared, giving an estimate  of what the per
item fee must be to have revenues  cover all variable costs. The volume changes  experienced for
each payment service, which differ somewhat from projections made earlier, are shown in Table 5.
Third, the projected TFC is divided by an estimate  of the number of batches  of payments  expected28
or the number  of accounts  serviced,  yielding an estimate  of the fixed fee to be charged  to have
revenues  cover fixed expenses.  The end result is a set of prices  which comprise  the two-part
pricing  schedule  of Table  4.
Table  5: Central  bank  revenues  and  payment  volumes  (United  States,  1996)
Revenue  Volume;
Paymentservice  Revenues  composition  :r
(US$ millions)  (%)  (%)
Check  603  74  -.4 ")
ACH  79  10  16.1
Funds  transfer  97  12  8.3
Book  entry  securities  transfer  17  2  9.7
Non-cash  collection  7  1  23.2
Special  cash  services  (2)  7  1  n.a.
Source:  Board  of Governors  of the  Federal  Reserve  System  (1997),  various  tables.
(1) Unsorted  check  volume  increased  by 1.6  %,  presorted  checks  fell by 9.1%,  and  returned  checks
rose  by 2.9%  (giving  the  -.4%  weighted  average  shown).
(2) The  provision  of currency  and  coin  to the general  public is  deemed  a public  service  and
therefore  is  provided  at  no charge  to  banks.  Special  cash  services  account  for only  about
2%  of the total  cost  of the (priced  and  nonpriced)  cash  service.
10.  Example  of a pricing system  - S.W.I.F.T.
The principles  discussed  above  can be well illustrated  by reviewing  the structure  of the
Membership  Pricing and Cost Recovery  philosophy  of S.W.I.F.T.  The following information  is
based  on the content  of the November,  1996  S.W.I.F.T.  User  Handbook  and is referenced  with the
approval  of S.W.I.F.T.
Membership  pricing:  The S.W.I.F.T.  Membership  Pricing Structure  consists  of  the
following elements:
+  Joining  fees;
*  Annual  support  charges;  and
*  Annual  charges  for additional  services.
Joining fees,  which are payable  by all  new customers  joining the S.W.I.F.T.  network,
consist  of the entry  fee  and one-time  charges  related  to connection.
All financial  institutions  joining S.W.I.F.T.  pay  an entry fee. The entry fee,  to some  extent,
is designed  and levied to  ensure  that new members  are not being disproportionately29
subsidized  by existing  members. Financial  institutions  eligible for full membership  (as
contrasted  with other  categories  of membership)  may  also  purchase  shares  at transfer  value
(not nominal value) and thus qualify to  participate  in the shareholder  decision making
process. The allocation of shares  to  new members  is made in accordance  with the
S.W.I.F.T.  policy prevailing  at the time of membership.  There  are also one-time  charges
related  to  connection  for  new S.W.I.F.T.  customers.  The connection charges  relate to
S.W.I.F.T.  products and services  including port access  and documentation,  with  each
product  and service  charged  individually. For  reasons  of compatibility,  some  products  and
services  are mandatory.  The products  and services  included in this scheme  include: ISO
registration  of  4-character  bank code (mandatory),  additional 4-character  bank code
registration,  registration  of S.W.I.F.T.  address  (mandatory),  registration  of logical terminal
(mandatory),  dedicated  port connection,  shared  port connection,  dedicated  cross  border
emergency  connection,  and  S.W.I.F.T.  User  Handbook  (one  set  being  mandatory).
Annual support charges  are levied based  on the category  of membership.  The annual
support charges  gives the customer  certain entitlements  covering: registration  of  BIC,
permitted number of  logical terminals, user handbook updates, BIC directory, and
addresses  in the BIC directory.  The actual  shareholding  of a member  provides  additional
address  registrations  entitlements.  When  a customer  cuts over  during the budget  year,  the
annual  support  charge  is charged  pro rata  for the remainder  of the budget  year.
Annual  charges  for additional  services,  in the main,  are  payable  in full even  if the service  is
only provided  for part  of the budget  year.  Annual  charges  are  made  for:
*  each  logical  terminal  additional  to the basic  entitlement.  This charge  is also payable  for
permanent  training  logical  terminals;
*  each  branch  code  registered  above  the basic  entitlement;  and
+  for updates  to additional  copies  of the User  Handbook.
Cost recovery: In April 1984,  the Board  of Directors  adopted  the principle  that the user
community  of each  country  or independent  constitutional  entity accessing  the S.W.I.F.T.  network
must  guarantee  recovery,  of at least,  the direct  operating  costs  incurred  by S.W.I.F.T.
The operating  costs  incurred  by S.W.I.F.T.  are  compared  to the revenues  generated  by the
users  of the country  concerned.  If these  revenues  do not cover  the operating  costs,  the shortfall  will
be invoiced  separately.
The costs  incurred  by S.W.I.F.T.  under  the cost  recovery  system  fall into two categories:  set-
up (one-time)  costs  and  annual  operating  costs.
*  Set-up  costs,  which are depreciated  over five years,  are those  incurred  by S.W.I.F.T.
prior to  cutover and include: site construction  (facilities, security equipment,  and30
telecommunication  equipment  including taxes and duties),  computer equipment (if
purchased),  S.W.I.F.T.  staff costs directly attributable  to the country charged at a
standard  rate, and operating  costs  ( international  telecommunication  circuits, lease  of
space  and regional  administration).
*  Annual operating costs include: lease  of space,  equipment  (rent and maintenance),
S.W.I.F.T.  staff  costs  charged  at a standard  rate,  regional  administration,  local corporate
taxes  (where  applicable),  and  intemational  telecommunications  circuits.
The  following calculation  applies:
a) Costs
One-time  costs  / 5 (five  years  depreciation)  = Annual  portion  of one-time  costs
+ Annual  operating  costs
=  Total  annual  operating  costs  to be  recovered.
b) Revenues  and  subsidy
Joining  fees  (one  time  fees  already  paid in full) / 5 = Annual  portion  of joining fees
(for purpose  of this calculation  only) + Revenues  from traffic  sent  + Revenues
from traffic received + Subsidy  on traffic  received
= Total  annual  revenues  and  subsidy.
c) Shortfall
Shortfall  (if result  is positive)
= Total annual  operating  costs - Total  annual  revenues  and subsidy.
The  specific  meaning  of the terms  used  in the above  revenues  and subsidy  calculations  are
as  follows:
+  joining fees  refer  to those  paid before  cutover  depreciated  over  five years.
*  Revenue  from  traffic  sent means  the number  of messages  sent  over  the S.W.I.F.T.  system
and billed to the customer.  "Revenue  from traffic received" means  the number of
messages  received  multiplied by the basic message  price. An additional subsidy per
message  received  is allocated  under  certain  circumstances.
*  It should be noted that extra  costs,  for example  those  exceeding  the standard  costs  for
international  circuits,  are  deducted  from the subsidy  on traffic  received.
*  New  joining  fees  are  the joining fees  of new members  or sub-members  joining S.W.I.F.T.
after  the country  cutover,  and are  added  to the annual  revenues  during  the year  following
the user's  cutover.31
Invoicing method:  Before  cutover,  new customers  are  asked  to provide  S.W.I.F.T.
with the results  of a traffic survey.  On the basis  of this survey  and S.W.I.F.T.'s  estimated  costs
related  to the customer's  country, S.W.I.F.T.  informs  the customers  whether or not the traffic is
expected  to cover  costs,  and if not, gives  an  estimate  of the amount  which will have  to recovered.
After cutover,  the costs  are reviewed  in the light of, for example,  exchange  rate, contract
prices,  local  taxes,  and  the amended  annual  amount  is divided by four to give the direct quarterly
costs.  The  costs  fixed at this point remain  in force  for the rest  of the budget  year.
At the end of each  quarter,  the following  calculation  is performed  by S.W.I.F.T.:
A-B-C-D-E-F  = R
where  A  =  direct  quarterly  costs
B  =  joining fees  (divided  by 5)
C  =  quarterly  revenue  from traffic  sent
D  =  quarterly  revenue  from  traffic  received
E  =  new joining fees,  if any  (divided  by 4)
F  =  subsidy  for traffic  received  (if any)
and  R  =  the amount  (if any)  to be  recovered.
If the direct  costs  are  lower  than  the revenues  (that  is, R is negative),  no reimbursement
will be  made  to the user.
If the direct  costs  are  higher  than  the revenues  (that  is, R is positive),  an additional  invoice
will be  sent  to each  user  to recover  his  share,  calculated  according  to the allocation  formula
defined  by the User  Group  Chairperson.
At the beginning  of each  subsequent  year,  the annual  costs  are reviewed  in the light of the
actual  costs.
S.W.I.F.T.  connection and  supplied equipment costs:  If it is necessary  for S.W.I.F.T.
to establish  a connection  between  a S.W.I.F.T.  Access  Point  (SAP)  and a user  by means  of either a
PSTN  connection  or a PDN  connection,  the cost  of doing  so is charged  to the receiving  customers.
Invoicing  frequency  depends  on usage;  it may  be  yearly,  half  yearly  or quarterly.
The price for PSTN  connections  are identical  for all customers  and will be based  on a per minute
price  that includes  all charges  incurred  by S.W.I.F.T.
PDN prices  can  either be based  on a flat rate  or can be usage  based.  A flat rate  implies  a
fixed periodic subscription  fee regardless  of the number  of messages  transmitted. A usage  based
price  as  applied  by S.W.I.F.T.  can  include  the following:32
*  number  of calls  made,  multiplied  by  a unit  price;
*  total  duration  of the  calls  made,  multiplied  by  a unit  price;  or
*  total  volume  of data  transmitted,  multiplied  by a  unit  price.
Any  equipment  or service,  for example,  modems,  supplied  by S.W.I.F.T.  at the  request  of a
customer,  is  charged  at  cost,  plus  a  6°h  administrative  charge.
S.W.I.F.T.  message pricing: A clearly  defined  price structure  exists  for the many  different
types  of S.W.I.F.T.  messages.  In  the  main,  the  message  pricing  structure,  depends  on  a combination
of message  type, message  length,  message  volume,  message  routing  category,  message  priority and
message  delivery  monitoring  options.
In essence,  the message  price structure,  is developed  based  on the proportion  of S.W.I.F.T.
costs  that are  attributable  to the provision  of the specific  service.
Other S.W.I.F.T.  services  pricing:  S.W.I.F.T.  also  supplies  a variety  of other  services  to its
customers  including security  products,  such  as, card readers,  integrated  circuit cards,  and secure
X25L service; BIC products,  education  services  and documentation.  A clearly defined pricing
structure  for each  of these  services  is made  available  to customers  and,  in the main,  is designed  to
facilitate  full cost  recovery.
Conclusion:  The above  summary  of key aspects  of the  S.W.I.F.T.  pricing arrangements
has been included to  demonstrate  that with careful attention to  detailed cost monitoring, a
comprehensive  price structure  can be developed  that is both fair to all system  participants  and
consistent  with a management  philosophy  of full cost recovery.  It is worth noting  that an additional
benefit  of the rigorous  approach  to cost monitoring  and control applied  by S.W.I.F.T.  has  resulted
in the realization  and maintenance  of lower  customer  costs  from  those  prevailing  a few years  ago.
11.  Summary  and conclusions
The cost of providing  payment  services  in a country  are  substantial,  on the order of 3% of
GDP. There  are two ways  these  costs  may be reduced  and both involve appropriately  pricing
payment  services. This applies  to commercial  banks  supplying  payment  services  to the general
public as well as central banks  supplying  a more narrow  set of payment  services  to the banking
system. First,  pricing payment  services  will induce users  to choose  those payment  instruments
which minimize  costs  relative  to the benefits  received. Second,  when prices  closely  reflect  the full
cost of producing each service,  users  will  demand  those services  which use the fewest real
resources.  Since  the available  data  indicate  that electronic  payments  generally  cost  only from one-
third to one-half  as  much  as paper-based  payments,  the current  cost  of a country's  payment  system
could be substantially  reduced  if payments  are properly  priced.  Indeed,  such  a goal has been  a
matter  of public policy in countries  in Scandinavia,  especially  Norway.33
Scale economies  exist in making  and processing  payments. As a result, the primary
discriminating  characteristic  among  payment  users  (consumer,  business,  and government  payors
and payees,  plus intermediary  banks)  is  the volume  of payments  associated  with each  participant  or
participant  group. A pricing methodology  which recovers  all costs  but yet properly  discriminates
among  users  according  to their payment  volume is two-part  pricing. Two-part  pricing contains  a
price covering  the average  fixed cost  of serving  each  participant  and a second  price covering  the
average  variable cost. Two-part  pricing is sustainable  in the sense  that a competitor  could not
supply  the same  service  without incurring  a loss,  unless  its costs  were  truly lower. If a competitor's
costs  were indeed  lower, then it-and not the existing  supplier-should  be  the entity providing  the
payment service,  otherwise  resources  are being wasted. Other, less important,  discriminating
characteristics  among  payment  service  users  would include  possible  differences  in the elasticity  of
demand  among  payment  users  and  the possibility  that both  payors  and payees  benefit  from making
a payment. There are ways of accommodating  these additional discriminating  characteristics
through  so-called  market  sensitive  pricing  and benefit-flow  pricing,  and both are  noted in the text.
However,  most of the goals  of pricing can be achieved  by implementing  two-part  pricing.  As
experience  with  pricing is gained over time, the pricing components  may be modified to
accommodate  additional discriminating  characteristics  (if they are deemed  to  be important),
potentially  improving  the sustainability  of the pricing  structure.
Two-part  pricing, fortunately,  is relatively  simple  to implement. It only requires  that: (1)
payment service costs (or cost estimates)  be decomposed  into their fixed and variable cost
components;  and (2),  an  estimate  be made  regarding  the expected  volume  of payments  that will be
demanded. The first requirement  is met through  application  of an elementary  cost  accounting
system  while the second  relies  on having  collected  some  current  or historical  volume  data. Many
banks  and central banks  in developed  countries  have implemented  two-part pricing, as well as
some  of its variants,  for the payment  services  they offer. The fact that this pricing structure  has
remained  in place  is  testament  to its usefulness  in attaining  the payment  goals  outlined  above.
The Bank's  work in the payments  system  reform  environment  focuses,  in the main,  on the
initial development  and implementation  of payment  mechanisms  by the central bank or by the
central  bank  in conjunction  with some  or all commercial  banks  in a specific  country.  In most  cases,
new inter-bank  payment  mechanisms,  are  established  under  the leadership  of the central  bank  and
are initially owned and operated  by the central bank. However,  in some  cases,  the Bank may
become  involved  with the establishment  of private  clearing  houses.  With this in mind, the primary
purpose  of this paper  is to further  consider  the specifics  of cost recovery  and pricing policy from
the view of the  publicly or privately  owned system  provider  in both the initial and longer  term
more  stable  operating  phases  of a payments  systems  reform  initiative  in a developing  economy.  As
such initiatives  are  frequently  funded  through re-payable  loans  some  suggestions  are made  as to
how the cost  recovery  policy might  relate  to loan  re-payment.34
Annex 1
Transaction Costs  of Paper-based  and Electronic Payments  in the US  and Norway
Totalpayment  costs in the U.S. Table  Al  illustrates  the (estimated)  per  transaction  cost  of a
paper-based  (check)  and electronic  (ACH)  payment  in the U.S. An electronic  payment  costs  $1.31,
which is only 45% of the $2.93  total expense  of a paper-based  payment." 8 Weighted  by the shares
of paper-based  check and electronic  (credit  card,  debit card, ACH) payments,  the average  U.S.
payment  transaction  costs  $2.60  and  totals  $204  billion a year. This represents  3% of GDP. On a
per person  basis,  each adult directly or indirectly  pays  $1,050 annually  just to make  payments.
Since  a consumer  payment  averages  around  $50,  transaction  costs  make  up 5% of the value of a
typical  consumer  payment.  Thus  the total payor,  payee,  and  bank  cost  of initiating,  processing,  and
settling  a payment  is not small. Indeed,  it is larger  than  most  would have  expected.
Bank  payment costs  in Norway.  Although  data on the total cost of payments  in other
countries  are not available,  survey  data from Norway provides  an estimate  of the bank cost of
processing  paper-based  (giro)  and electronic  (giro)  payments.  The payor  plus payee  bank  cost of a
paper-based  giro payment  is $1.34  while an electronic  giro payment-an  average  of a direct debit
and  a direct  deposit-is  $.35.'9
At the bank level, an electronic  payment  in Norway costs  only 26% of a paper-based
payment. While the estimated  bank costs  of electronic  and paper-based  payments  in the U.S.
appear  to be equal  (Table  Al), the overall  cost  of a U.S.  electronic  payment  is 45% of the cost  of a
paper-based  payment. Although  the source  and magnitude  of the cost advantage  for electronic
payments  differs between  these  two countries,  the clear implication  is that electronic  payments
have a  lower cost, and therefore should also have a  lower price, than their paper-based
alternatives.  Resources  can  usually  be saved  when  electronic  payments  replace  paper  payments.
Costs  faced by payors.  There  are  three primary payment  cost elements  in Table Al  but
payors  may  not directly face  all three  when making  their decision  on which payment  instrument  to
use. Consumer  payors  typically  do not  face  directly  either bank  or payee  costs.  While consumers
will  directly face their own "expenses"  (time  taken to initiate a payment,  the maintenance  of a
adequate  supply  of cash/non-cash  balances,  etc.),  most  of these  will not be in explicit money  terms
per transaction  but  instead will  be evaluated in  terms of  differences  in  the convenience,
acceptability,  and safety  of using  different  payment  instruments.  Mailing  expenses  associated  with
paper-based  bill payments  are  the exception.
18 The  notes  to Table  1 summarize  the main  elements  underlying  these  cost  estimates.  Even  greater  detail is in the
Data  Appendix  to Wells  (1996).
'9 Robinson  and Flatraaker  (1995),  Table  1, provide  this information  in Norwegian  krona which is translated  into
dollars  at NOK 7.09  =  $1.35
Table  Al:  Payor,  payee,  and  bank  cost  for paper-based  and  electronic  payments  (U.S.,  1993)
Per transaction  Paper-based  payment  Electronicpayment
expenses  for  (check)  (ACH)
(In US$)  (In US$)
Payor  1)  1.39  0.80
Payee  (2)  1.25  0.23
Bank  (3)  0.29  0.28
2.93  1.31
Source:  Wells  (1996),  using  averages  of ranges  reported  for the various  components.  The
reported  figures  represent  weighted  averages  for consumer,  business,  and  government
payments.  Float  costs  ($.09  for checks)  have  been  excluded  since  float  is a  transfer
payment.
(1) Payor  costs  of check  use  are  composed  of check  printing  and  distribution  costs  ($.0345),
postage  cost  ($.18), and  business  cost  of issuing  checks  ($1.18).  ACH payor  costs  only  include
the business  cost  of initiating  a preauthorized  direct  debit  or a direct  deposit  of payroll  ($.80).
(2) Payee  costs  are  composed  of the cost  of accepting  a check  ($1.25)  at the  point-of-sale  or
for bill payments  or the cost  (including  accounting  expenses)  of  accepting  a  preauthorized
direct  ACH debit  ($.23).
(3) Bank  costs  of processing  checks  and  ACH payments  ($.29  and  $.28,  respectively)  include
fraud  costs  and  central  bank  processing  and  settlement  expenses.
Business  payors,  in contrast,  will face directly a large percentage  of their total payment
costs. First,  business  expenses  are routinely  identified  and reported  to management,  so payment
costs  are  typically quantified. Second,  each  business  payor  initiates  a larger  volume of payments
(for employee  payroll  and purchases  from other  firms)  than  does  each  consumer  payor,  and these
expenses  are usually  too large  to be ignored. Thus  businesses  are better  able to put an explicit
monetary  value on their own internal  payment  expenses  with those  directly paid to banks. Since
businesses  will directly  face  a larger  portion  of the payment  expenses  they incur,  they will be more
sensitive  to differences  in payment  instrument  costs.
Costs  faced  by payees.  Payees  receiving  consumer  point-of-sale  and bill payments  will
experience  different expenses  depending  on the payment  instrument  used. In some  countries,
these  are made  explicit to consumer  payors  but in other  countries  they are  not. This aside,  Table
A2 illustrates  how the average  cost of accepting  different  payment  instruments  can vary whether
expressed  on a per  transaction  basis  or for each  $100  of sales. Despite  this difference,  retailers  in
the U.S.  rarely  charge  different  fees  or give discounts  to encourage  the use  of particular  instruments36
at the point of sale. More  commonly,  differential  payee  payment  expenses  are simply folded into
the overall  price  of the goods  being  sold or the bill for services  rendered. 20
Table  A2: Supermarket  payment  costs  for different  payment  instruments  (United  States,  1994)
iCost  per  Cost  per $  100T
Payment  instrument  transaction  of sales
(In US$)  (In US$)
Cash  0.07  0.52
Check  0.43  1.20
Credit  card  0.81  2.27
Debit  card  0.30  0.94
Source:  Food  Marketing  Institute  (1994)
Costs  incurred  by banks. Bank  payment  costs  for the demand  deposit  activity can be
decomposed  into variable  and fixed components.  Variable  costs  (labor,  supplies,  transportation,
etc.)  rise  with significant  (say  5% to 10%)  increases  in payment  volume,  even  though  their cost  per
unit of  payment  volume processed  may remain stable.  Fixed costs (in this case buildings,
computers,  etc.) remain  stable  with significant  changes  in payment  volume, although  these  too
would rise  if volume increased  by an  especially  large  amount  (say  more  than  20% to 30%).
Table  A3 illustrates  the major  components  of bank payment  costs  associated  with demand
deposit  activity. For  the average  medium  sized  U.S.  bank,  the largest  allocated  expense  is  for labor
(48%),  followed by other variable expenses  (27%) and capital or fixed expenses  (25%).  The
distinction  between  variable  and fixed costs  is important  since  this can indicate  the potential  for
scale  economies.
20 In Table  A2, the payee  cost  of accepting  a credit  card is almost  twice that of other  instruments.  Payees,  not the
payor,  pay  a transaction  fee  of from 1%  to 3  %  of the value  of the  sale  when  a credit  card  is used. When  business  payees
do not vary  their  output  prices  depending  on the payment  instrument  used,  credit  card  users  will be cross-subsidized  by
consumers  who  choose  to use  instruments  (cash,  check,  electronic  debits)  that  have  a lower cost  to the  payee.37
Table  A3: Components  of payment  costs  for  the average  bank  (United  States,  1994)
Percent
Cost  component  Operating  cost  composition
(In US$)  (%)
Labor  expenses:
Salaries  1,978,072  38
Fringe  benefits  525,473  10
Other  expenses:
Supplies  142,282  3
Transportation  172,278  3
Other  1,084,771  21
Total  variable  costs  3,902,876  75
Capital  expenses:
Data  processing  480,376  9
Furniture  and  equipment  293,511  6
Building  occupancy  537,700  10
Total  fixed  costs  1,311,587  25
Source:  Federal  Reserve  System  (1994),  demand  deposit  function.  Data  are  for
the  average  medium  sized  bank  with  deposits  of  $200  million  to  $1  billion.38
Annex  2
Empirical  Evidence  of Scope  and Scale  Economies
Empirically  significant  scope  economies  do not appear  to exist among broad classes  of
payments  such as checks,  ACH, and wire transfers  (Bauer  and Ferrier, 1996).  Nor do scope
economies  apply to the joint processing  of cash  and non-cash  payments.  This is because  these
particular  payment  instruments  do not  appear  to share  a significant  portion  of their costs.
Scale  economies  exist up to a point for processing  paper-based  payments  (Bauer,  1993).
However,  after a certain large  volume is attained,  unit costs  no longer  fall but remain relatively
constant. In contrast,  electronic  payments  appear  to experience  scale  economies  regardless  of the
volume of current  transactions  (Bauer  and Hancock,  1995). This relationship  may or may not
continue  if electronic  payment  volumes  became  extremely  large.
Efficiency in  producing payment  services.  Payment  costs can be reduced  when the
productivity  or efficiency  of producing  payment  services  is improved.  This involves  comparing  the
costs  of producing  a particular  payment  service  among  either different  payment  processors  in the
same country (e.g., Bauer  and Hancock, 1993) or between processors  in different countries.
Holding  constant  those  cost differences  believed  to be beyond  the strong  control of management,
such  as the local price of labor, the unit cost of computers  and buildings,  and the cost of local
transportation  and supplies,  it is possible  to identify statistically  the set of production  units  which
have the lowest costs  due to  "best practice"  organizational  structure  or use of more efficient
processing  technology. When the identified  best  practices  are applied  to those  production  units
where  costs  are  currently  higher  than  average,  productivity  should  rise  and  costs  should  fall. 2"
Figure  3 illustrates  the scale,  scope,  and best  practice  (or frontier payment  cost)  concepts.
The scatter  plot shows  the average  cost  per check  processed  at 47 offices  of the U.S.  central  bank
over 1983-90. If a cost function is fitted to all of these  observations,  the average  relationship
between  unit cost  and payment  volume  is identified  (holding  input prices,  product  mix, and certain
other cost influences  constant).  The  downward  slope  of the fitted curve  (thin solid line) indicates
that scale  economies  exist but that at moderate  volumes  average  cost  flattens  out and becomes
constant. If volume rose  beyond  80 million processed  items  (per  office per  quarter),  average  costs
would essentially  be  constant  as  the volume  of processed  payments  expands.
21  Such  comparisons  and productivity  improvements  have  been  performed  successfully  among  branch  offices  of a
single  bank (surveyed  in Berger  and Humphrey,  1997). Since  the primary  function  of a bank branch  is to accept  and
make  payments  among  depositor  accounts,  such  restructuring  has improved  the efficiency  of bank  payment  processing
operations.39
Figure  3: Average  check  processing  cost
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Scope  economies,  if they exist,  would lead to a downward  shift in the fitted cost curve
(dotted  line).  If the volume of one payment  instrument  was unchanged  at 80 million items, its
marginal  and average  cost  could still be reduced  (say,  falling  from the thin solid line to the dotted
line) as the volume of a second  instrument  processed  at the same  facility was expanded. Here
expanding  the scope  of operations,  rather  than  their  scale,  carn  lower  costs.
If attention  is focused  instead  on  those  processing  offices  which experience  the lowest unit
costs,  a "frontier" of best-practice  offices  can be identified  (thick  solid line). The downward  slope
of the frontier indicates  that similar scale  economies  are experienced  by the set of most efficient
processing  offices,  although  such  a similarity  need  not hold in general.  A similar  scope  effect  may
exist  for frontier  offices  as  well (not  shown).40
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